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A UNIFYING IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM
PRISCILLA T. Y. MAN AND SHINO TAKAYAMA
Abstract. This paper considers social choice correspondences assigning a choice set to
each non-empty subset of social alternatives. We impose three requirements on these corre-
spondences: unanimity, independence of preferences over infeasible alternatives and choice
consistency with respect to choices out of all possible alternatives. With more than three
social alternatives and the universal preference domain, any social choice correspondence
that satises our requirements is serially dictatorial. A number of known impossibility the-
orems | including Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem and
the impossibility theorem under strategic candidacy | follow as corollaries. Our new proof
highlights the common logical underpinnings behind these theorems.
1. Introduction
This paper considers social choice correspondences dened on all subsets of social alter-
natives. Three axioms are imposed:
Strong Unanimity: Only the unique weakly Pareto dominant alternative within the
subset is chosen whenever there is one.
Independence of Infeasible Alternatives: Choices from subsets depend only on
the preferences over the subsets.
Independence of Losing Alternatives: An alternative is chosen from a subset if
and only if it is chosen out of the set of all social alternatives whenever such a choice
remains available.
With more than three social alternatives and the universal preference domain, any social
choice correspondence that satises our three axioms is serially dictatorial. Since our axioms
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1imply Arrow's Choice Axiom (an alternative is chosen out of a subset if and only if it is
chosen out of a superset whenever choices from the superset are available), our theorem can
be viewed as a choice-theoretic version of Arrow's theorem with the Pareto and rationality
axioms weakened as much as possible.
Weakening Arrow's axioms is more than an aesthetic exercise. It claries the basic axioms
on social choice that imply dictatorship. Arrow's Choice Axiom has been interpreted as a
rationality axiom (Arrow, 1959; Hansson, 1968). Our result indicates, however, that this ra-
tionality condition follows from three fundamental requirements: unanimity, independence of
preferences over infeasible alternatives and choice consistency with respect to choices out of
all possible alternatives. Our formulation also provides the logical link between Arrow's In-
dependence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Arrow's Choice Axiom | two related but dierent
concepts that have caused some confusions
1.
More importantly, it is easy to check that axioms in many impossibility theorems imply our
three weakened axioms (with an appropriate extension to our unrestricted domain). Thus
a number of impossibility theorems | including Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (Arrow,
1963), the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975), the Muller-
Satterthwaite Theorem (Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977), the Jackson-Srivastava character-
ization of game theoretic solutions that implement only dictatorial social choice functions
(Jackson and Srivastava, 1996), the Grether-Plott Theorem (Grether and Plott, 1982) and
the Dutta-Jackson-Le Breton impossibility theorem under strategic candidacy (Dutta, Jack-
son, and Le Breton, 2001) | are corollaries of our main theorem. While it is known that one
can convert the questions in many of these theorems into a social welfare function problem
and apply Arrow's Theorem, our unied proof indicates that there are common and intuitive
principles | unanimity and two independence axioms | behind these theorems.
The weakened axioms also point us to a new line of proof. Example 2.5 shows that
our three axioms do not immediately imply Monotonicity (a chosen alternative remains
chosen whenever its relative ranking has improved), which is a key property in proofs of
impossibility theorems (e.g.: Barber a (1980, 1983); Beno^ t (2000); Sen (2001); Geanakoplos
(2005)). Rather than following the usual practice of moving an alternative up a chain of
preference proles to nd the pivotal individual, our proof exploits a fact about social choice
when the union of individuals' set of favorite alternatives has only two elements (Lemma 3.2).
This technique employs fewer preference proles and shed light on the set of preference
proles necessary for proving an impossibility theorem.
1The original denition of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (Arrow, 1963, p. 27) corresponds to our
Independence of Infeasible Alternatives. However, Arrow's motivating examples | death of a candidate
(p. 26) and rank-order voting (p. 27) | are violations of our Independence of Losing Alternatives, hence
Arrow's Choice Axiom. See Denicol o (2000) for a discussion.
2Needless to say, this is not the rst paper to provide an alternative proof of (a version
of) Arrow's Theorem
2, nor is it the rst attempt to oer a unied proof of several impos-
sibility theorems. Reny (2001) provides parallel proofs of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, upon which Eliaz (2004) builds a single proof
of the two theorems. Using a social preference framework, Barber a (2003) highlights the
common properties shared by the social aggregation rules underlying several impossibility
theorems. All these proofs require some version of Monotonicity, which is not directly im-
plied by our axioms. Recently, Vohra (2011) proves Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem and the strategic candidacy impossibility theorem using in-
teger programming techniques. Unlike us, he uses Arrow's Theorem to prove the other two
theorems.
2. Model
Let X be the set of all possible social alternatives, jXj  3 and nite3. Let R be the set
of all complete, transitive binary relations on X, that is, the set of all weak preferences over
X. Let P  R be the set of all strict preferences over X. We abuse notation to use N as
both the set of all individuals and its cardinality, which is nite.
A (weak) preference of individual i 2 N is denoted by %i2 R. The symbols i and i
will have their usual derived meanings. Let %= (%1;:::;%N) 2 RN be a preference prole.
Similarly, a strict preference of an individual i 2 N and a strict preference prole are denoted
as i2 P and 2 P N respectively.
Two preference proles %;%
02 RN agree on Y if they induce the same preference ordering
on the subset of alternatives Y  X. Given a subset of alternatives Y  X and a preference
prole %2 RN, we say %
Y2 RN takes Y to the top from % if % and %
Y agree on Y and
y Y
i z for all i whenever y 2 Y and z = 2 Y .
A social choice correspondence is a mapping f : (2X n ;)  RN ! 2X n ; such that
f (Y;%)  Y for all Y  X and all %2 RN. We impose the following axioms on a social
choice correspondence:
Denitions 2.1 (Main Axioms). A social choice correspondence f is
Strongly Unanimous (SU) if f (Y;%) = fyg whenever y is uniquely weakly Pareto dom-
inant in Y  X (i.e., for all y0 2 Y n fyg, y %i y0 for all i 2 N with at least one
individual having a strict preference);
2See Campbell and Kelly (2002) for an overview.
3Finiteness of X ensures the existence of best alternatives on any feasible set according to any preferences.
This assumption can be relaxed at the cost of distracting technical qualications, which we would like to
avoid.




whenever % and %
0
agree on Y  X;
Independent of Losing Alternatives (ILA) if f (Y;%) = f (X;%) \ Y whenever the inter-
section is non-empty.
Strong Unanimity by itself is weaker than Strong Pareto Optimality (any weakly Pareto
dominated alternative cannot be chosen). Together with ILA, though, it does imply that
weakly Pareto dominated alternatives cannot be chosen out of the set of all alternatives:
Claim 2.2. If a social choice correspondence f satises SU and ILA, then x = 2 f(X;%)
whenever x is weakly Pareto dominated at % (i.e., there exists a y 2 X such that y %i x for
all i 2 N with at least one strict preference).
Proof. Suppose y weakly Pareto dominates x at %. SU implies f(fx;yg;%) = fyg. Thus
x = 2 f(X;%) or else ILA will be violated. 
Of more interests is the relationship between our axioms and two other axioms commonly
employed in social choice theory, dened as follows:
Denitions 2.3. A social choice correspondence f satises
Arrow's Choice Axiom (ACA)5 if f (Z;%) = f (Y;%) \ Z for any Y  Z whenever the
intersection is non-empty;
Monotonicity if Y  f(X;%
0)  f(X;%) whenever Y  f(X;%) and y %i x implies
y %0
i x (with y i x implies y 0
i x) for all y 2 Y , all x 2 X and all i 2 N.6
Claim 2.4. A social choice correspondence satises ACA if it satises SU, IIF and ILA.
Proof. Let Z  Y  X and suppose f(Y;%) \ Z 6= ;. Obtain %
Y by taking Y to the top of
%. Claim 2.2, ILA and IIF imply f(X;%
Y) = f(Y;%
Y) = f(Y;%), which has a non-empty
intersection with Z. ILA requires f(Z;%
Y) = f(X;%
Y)\Z. Using f(X;%
Y) = f(Y;%) and
f(Z;%) = f(Z;%
Y) (IIF, since Z  Y ), we get f(Z;%) = f (Y;%) \ Z. 
Denicol o (2000) shows that a Pareto optimal social choice function satises both IIF and
ACA if and only if it satises Hansson's Independence (Hansson, 1969). Claim 2.4 improves
upon his statement by giving the conditions that bridge the gap between IIF and ACA.
4This condition is best known as \Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives" (Arrow, 1963). \Independence
of Infeasible Alternatvies" (Ehlers and Weymark, 2003; Le Breton and Weymark, 2011) is more precise on
the \irrelevance" of alternatives outside Y . To avoid confusion, we follow Le Breton and Weymark (2011)
in using the acronym IIF and reserve IIA for Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Another option is
\Independence of Nonfeasible Alternatives" (Karni and Schmeidler, 1976).
5Arrow's Choice Axiom has also been known as Independence of Nonoptimal Alternatives (Karni and Schmei-
dler, 1976) and Strong Stability (Campbell, 1979).
6This denition coincides with Strong Positive Association (Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977) when f is a
function.
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Figure 1. Preferences and Social Choices for Example 2.5
One can stop here and prove a choice-theoretic version of Arrow's theorem (c.f.: Le Breton
and Weymark, 2011, Theorem 19) in the usual manner | convert the problem into a social
preference problem and apply Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. This route calls for a proof
of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, which typically invokes Monotonicity. Intriguingly, SU,
IIF and ILA do not immediately imply Monotonicity7, as the next example shows.
Example 2.5. There are 3 alternatives, X = fx;y;zg and 3 individuals, N = f1;2;3g.
The preference domain admits only two strict preference proles,  and 0, as depicted in
Figure 1(a).8 Note that 0 diers from  only by moving x above y for individual 3. The
social choice function given by Figure 1(b) satises SU, IIF and ILA9 but not monotonicity.
To see this, rst note that SU has no bite in this example. The two proles  and 0 agree
only on fx;zg and fy;zg. IIF is satised since choices from these subsets are equal across
preference proles. ILA is satised since f(X;) = fxg and f (Y;) = fxg for all subsets Y
containing x; and similarly f(X;0) = fyg and f (Y;0) = fyg for all subsets Y containing
y. Yet Monotonicity is violated as f (X;) = fxg and the ranking of x improves from  to
0 but f (X;0) = fyg.
Thus, as a direct proof (i.e., one that does not appeal to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem),
our proof in Section 3 oers a new approach for proving impossibility theorems. Before doing
so, we need to dene dictatorship.
For any subset of alternatives Y  X and any individual preference %i2 R, let
T(Y;%i) = fy 2 Y : y %i y
0 for all y
0 2 Y g
be the \top set" | the set of favorite alternatives | within Y according to %i. Let
 = (1;:::;N) be a permutation of the set of all individuals. Write also k = (1;:::;k)
7As a trivial corollary of our main theorem, any social choice correspondence that is SU, IIF and ILA is
Monotonic. This example indicates such an implication is hard to establish without rst proving dictatorship.
8Since the relative ranking between x and y changes across the proles, introducing fx;yg by bringing fx;yg
to the top does not help.
9Since there are only three alternatives, ILA is equivalent to ACA. Thus this example remains even if we
assume ACA.







erences of individuals in k. For all subsets Y , all preference proles % and all permutations















Denitions 2.6 (Dictatorship). A social choice correspondence f is
Dictatorial if there exists an individual i 2 N such that f(Y;%)  T(Y;%i) for all Y  X
and all %2 RN;
Serially Dictatorial if there exists a permutation of individuals  and a tie-breaking pref-
erence  2 R such that
f(Y;%) = T(T
N(Y;%;);) for all Y  X, all %2 R
N.
Two features of our denition of serial dictatorship should be noted. First, the permutation
of individuals  and the tie-breaking preference  are xed for all preference proles. This
rules out serial dictatorship in which the order of later dictators depends on the preferences
of earlier dictators. Second, a tie-breaking preference  is applied at the end. If f is required
to be a function, we can choose some  2 P.10 On the other extreme, we can set  as the
preference that is indierent between all alternatives if no ties are to be broken.
3. Main Theorem
Theorem 3.1. Any social choice correspondence that is Strongly Unanimous, Independent
of Infeasible Alternatives and Independent of Losing Alternatives is Serially Dictatorial.
The rest of this section contains the proof. We will rst give a useful lemma. It will then
be used in Section 3.1 and 3.2, which construct the permutation  and the tie-breaking pref-
erence , respectively. Our argument also indicates that if the preference domain is restricted
to P N, any social choice correspondence that satises SU, IIF and ILA is dictatorial.
Lemma 3.2. Let f be a SU, IIF and ILA social choice correspondence and % be a preference












10This will not violate Strong Unanimity since SU applies only when there is a unique weakly Pareto dominant
alternative.























Figure 2. Preference Proles for Proof of Lemma 3.2





 = 1 follows from SU. So let
S
i2S T(X;%i) = fx;yg and
suppose by contradiction that z 2 f (X;%) for some z 6= x;y.
Since
S
i2S T(X;%i) = fx;yg, there are three types of individuals in S: those whose
favorite is x (Type x), y (Type y) and those whose favorites are x and y (Type xy) (Fig-
ure 2(a)). Construct a new preference prole %
0 by moving, for all Type y individuals, the
ranking of x up to just below y, keeping all else unchanged (Figure 2(b)). Similarly, construct
%
00 by moving y to just below x for all Type x individuals (Figure 2(c)). Observe that
(1) %, %
0 and %
00 agree on fx;yg;
(2) % and %
0 agree on fy;zg; and
(3) % and %
00 agree on fx;zg.





. Meanwhile, all alternatives other than x and y are weakly Pareto domi-
nated by x at %
0. Claim 2.2 says none of them can be chosen out of X at %
0. Thus
y = 2 f(X;%



























= fyg. This contradicts IIF in
light of observation (1). 
3.1. Serial Dictators. Given a SU, IIF and ILA social choice correspondence f, we con-





k) for all Y  X, all %2 R
N. (1)
The case for k = 0 follows by denition. Now suppose k 1 is dened and Equation (1)
holds for k 1. We construct k that satises Equation (1) for k in 3 steps: Step 1 identies
a group of individuals containing the desired k. Step 2 shows that whenever this group of
individuals have the same preferences over Y  X, the social choice out of Y is always a
subset of their favorites in T k 1(Y;%
k 1
;k 1). Step 3 shrinks this group to a singleton,







Figure 3. Condorcet Cycle
















Figure 4. Preference Proles for Step 2.1
giving us k. Step 4 is given when the above 3-step proof is infeasible (this happens if N < 3
or k > N   2).
Step 1. If N < 3 or k > N   2 proceed directly to Step 4. Otherwise, construct a
preference prole %
 where (1) 1;:::k 1 are indierent between all alternatives; (2) the
remaining individuals have one of the Condorcet preferences in Figure 3; and (3) all individual
preferences in the Condorcet cycle are assigned to at least one individual.
Since all alternatives other than x, y and z are weakly Pareto dominated, by Claim 2.2,
f(X;%
)  fx;y;zg. Without loss assume x 2 f(X;%
). Let S  N nf1;:::;k 1g be the
set of individuals who have the Type x preference in the Condorcet cycle.
Step 2. We show whenever individuals in S have the same preference over Y  X, the
social choice from Y is a subset of their favorites in Yk 1  T k 1(Y;%
k 1
;k 1). This is
done by three smaller steps: Step 2.1 proves this for Y = fx;yg (the top 2 alternatives in
the Type x Condorcet preference); Step 2.2 for any two-element subset Y ; and Step 2.3 for
any subset Y  X.
Step 2.1. We show whenever individuals in S have the same preferences over fx;yg, the
social choice from fx;yg is a subset of their favorites in fx;ygk 1  T k 1(fx;yg;%
k 1
;k 1).
This is trivial if fx;ygk 1 is a singleton or if x i y for all i 2 S.
Construct a preference prole %
1 where (1) 1;:::;k 1 are indierent between all alter-
natives; (2) all individuals in S have the Type x Condorcet preference; and (3) all other
individuals' unique favorite is z (Figure 4(a)). Notice that %
1 and %
 agree on fx;zg. Since







Figure 5. Preference Prole %
3 for Step 2.2
x is chosen out of X at %
, IIF and ILA imply x 2 f(fx;zg;%
1) = f(fx;zg;%
). Mean-
while, Lemma 3.2 requires f(X;%
1)  fx;zg. By ILA x 2 f(X;%
1). Since y = 2 f(X;%
1)
(Lemma 3.2), applying ILA once more gives f(fx;yg;%
1) = fxg. Notice that %
1 puts no re-
striction on the relative ranking between x and y for individuals not in f1;:::;k 1g[S. IIF
therefore implies f(fx;yg;%) = fxg for all % such that 1;:::;k 1 are indierent between
x and y and all individuals in S strictly prefer x to y.
Next construct a preference prole %
2 from %
1 by switching the positions of x and y in
%
1
S and keeping everything else unchanged (Figure 4(b)). Since %
1 and %
2 agree on fx;zg,
IIF requires x 2 f(fx;zg;%
2). Yet Lemma 3.2 requires f(X;%
2)  fy;zg, so z = 2 f(X;%
2)
or else ILA would be violated. Hence f(X;%
2) = fyg. Applying ILA once more gives
f(fx;yg;%
2) = fyg. Since %
2 puts no restriction on the relative ranking between x and y
for individuals not in f1;:::;k 1g [ S, IIF implies f(fx;yg;%) = fyg for all % such that
1;:::;k 1 are indierent between x and y and all individuals in S strictly prefer y to x.
Step 2.2. We show whenever all individuals in S have the same preferences over a two-
element subset fw;zg  X, the social choice from fw;zg is a subset of their favorites in
fw;zgk 1  T k 1(fw;zg;%
k 1
;k 1). The statement is trivial if fw;zgk 1 is a singleton or
if w i z for all i 2 S. There is also nothing to prove if fw;zg = fx;yg. So without loss
assume y = 2 fw;zg.
Create a preference prole %
3 where (1) 1;:::;k 1 are indierent between all alterna-
tives; (2) all individuals in S have w as their unique favorite and strictly prefer x to y; and
(3) all other individuals' unique favorite is y (Figure 5). By Lemma 3.2, f(X;%
3)  fw;yg.
However, all individuals in S strictly prefer x to y. Step 2.1 implies f(fx;yg;%
3) = fxg.
ILA then requires f(X;%
3) = fwg. Applying ILA once more gives f(fw;zg;%
3) = fwg.
Since %
3 puts no restriction on the relative ranking between w and z for individuals not
in f1;:::;k 1g [ S, IIF implies f(fw;zg;%) = fwg for all % such that 1;:::;k 1 are
indierent between w and z and all individuals in S strictly prefer w to z.
Switching the names of w and z gives f(fw;zg;%) = fzg for all % such that 1;:::;k 1
are indierent between w and z and all individuals in S strictly prefer z to w.
9Step 2.3. We show whenever all individuals in S have the same preferences over Y  X,
the social choice from Y is a subset of their favorites in Yk 1  T k 1(Y;%
k 1
;k 1).
Given a preference prole % at which all individuals in S have the same preferences over
Y , obtain %
Y by taking Y to the top from % (see Section 2). If k > 1, the induction
hypothesis (Equation (1)) ensures f(X;%
Y)  Yk 1. Otherwise, f(X;%
Y)  Y = Y0 since
all alternatives not in Y are Pareto dominated (Claim 2.2). Moreover, 1;:::;k 1 are
indierent between all alternatives in Yk 1.
If y is a favorite for group S in Yk 1 and y0 2 Yk 1 is not, Step 2.2 requires f(fy;y0g;%
Y) =
fyg. ILA implies y0 = 2 f(X;%
Y). Thus f(X;%
Y) is a subset of group S's favorites in Yk 1.
Applying ILA once more gives f(Y;%
Y)  T(Yk 1;%
Y




S) = T(Yk 1;%S), f(Y;%)  T(Yk 1;%S).
Remark on Step 2 Step 2 implies that the choice out of X at any Condorcet prole is
a singleton. For if not there will be at least two disjoint subsets of individuals that can
get their favorites out of Yk 1 whenever preferences over Y within each group are the same.
Contradiction arises when the preferences of these groups conict with each other.
Step 3 If S is a singleton, letting k = S completes our induction step. Otherwise, construct
a preference prole %
 where (1) 1;:::;k 1 are indierent between all alternatives; (2)
all individuals in S have either the Type x or Type y Condorcet preference (with both
types assigned to at least one individual); and (3) all remaining individuals get the Type z
Condorcet preference.
Notice that only Type z individuals rank z above y in the Condorcet cycle (see Figure 3).
Since y 
i z for all i 2 S, Step 2 implies z = 2 f(fy;zg;%
). By ILA and Claim 2.2,
f(X;%
)  fx;yg. Also, by the Remark on Step 2, f(X;%
) must be a singleton.
So let S2  S be the set of individuals whose favorite at %
 is chosen out of X. Repeat
Step 2 applied to S2. Proceeding this way gives us a strictly decreasing sequence of subsets
of individuals Sn    S2  S such that each Sn group gets their favorites out of Yk 1
whenever they have the same preference over Y . Since N is nite, Sn must be a singleton
at some nite n. Setting k = Sn completes our induction proof.
Step 4. Step 1 is infeasible when there are two or fewer individuals not assigned to the
permutation  (this happens when N < 3 or k > N  2). This step takes care of such cases.
When there are only two individuals left, construct the Condorcet prole %
 as in Step 1
without using the Type z preference. Lemma 3.2 requires f(X;%
)  fx;yg. Proceed with
the same argument as above.
When there is only one individual left, construct  by appending the last individual to
N 1. Given Y  X and %2 RN, construct %
Y by taking Y to the top from %. The
induction hypothesis ensures f(X;%
Y)  YN 1. Now if y is a favorite for N in YN 1
and y0 is not, y weakly Pareto dominates y0 (since 1;:::;N 1 are indierent between all
10alternatives in YN 1). By Claim 2.2, f(X;%
Y)  T(YN 1;%
Y




N). Since f(Y;%) = f(Y;%
Y) (IIF) and T(YN 1;%
Y
N) =
T(YN 1;%N), f(Y;%)  T(YN 1;%N).
Remark. The argument in the k = 1 step is unaected if the preference domain is restricted
to P N. Since the existence of 1 implies dictatorship, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 3.3. Any social choice correspondence f : (2Xn;)P N ! (2Xn;) that is Strongly
Unanimous, Independent of Infeasible Alternatives and Independent of Losing Alternatives
is Dictatorial.
3.2. Tie-Breaking Preference. It remains to nd the tie-breaking preference  2 R such
that
f(Y;%) = T(T
N(Y;%;);) for all Y  X, all %2 R
N.
So let  denote the preference prole in which all individuals are indierent between all
alternatives. Given a social choice correspondence f, dene a binary relation  on X such
that for all x;y 2 X,
x  y if and only if x 2 f(fx;yg;).
Claim 3.4. The binary relation  is complete and transitive. That is,  2 R.
Proof. Completeness: For any x;y 2 X, f(fx;yg;) 6= ;.11 Thus either x  y or y  x.
Transitivity: Take x;y;z 2 X and suppose x  y and y  z. Construct %
 by taking
fx;y;zg to the top from . IIF implies x and y are chosen out of fx;yg and fy;zg at
%
 respectively. We claim x 2 f(X;%
). Suppose not, then since x 2 f(fx;yg;%
), ILA
requires y = 2 f(X;%
). Applying ILA once more implies z = 2 f(X;%
). But this contradicts
Claim 2.2 since all alternatives other than x, y and z are strictly Pareto dominated at %
.
Now by ILA and IIF we have x 2 f(fx;zg;%
) = f(fx;zg;). Therefore x  z. 
Fix Y  X and %2 RN. Construct %
Y by taking Y to the top from %. Our argument in
Section 3.1 ensures f(X;%
Y)  YN = T N(Y;%;). Notice that %
Y and  agree on YN since
all individuals are indierent between all alternatives in YN.
The proof of f(Y;%
Y)  T(YN;) is essentially the same as the proof in Step 2.3 in
Section 3.1 and will therefore be omitted. We show that f(Y;%
Y)  T(YN;). Let y 2
T(YN;) and y0 2 f(X;%
Y)  YN. By the denition of , y 2 f(fy;y0g;). Since both y
and y0 are in YN,  and %
Y agree on fy;y0g. IIF requires y 2 f(fy;y0g;%
Y) = f(fy;y0g;).
Meanwhile, as y0 2 f(X;%
Y)\fy;y0g, ILA requires y 2 f(X;%
Y). Applying ILA once more
gives y 2 f(Y;%
Y). Hence T(YN;)  f(Y;%
Y).
Combining the results we get f(Y;%
Y) = T(YN;). By IIF, f(Y;%) = f(Y;%
Y). Hence
f(Y;%) = T(YN;) = T(T N(Y;%);). This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
11f(fx;xg;) = f(fxg;) = fxg for all x 2 X.
114. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
In Arrow (1963), a social welfare function is a mapping F : RN ! R. Given a preference
prole %2 RN, a permutation of individuals  = (1;:::;N) and a tie-breaking preference
 2 R, write %N+1=  and dene the lexicographic ordering L(%;;) 2 R such that
x L(%;;) y if and only if whenever y k x, there exists an l < k such that x l y.
Denitions 4.1. A social welfare function F : RN ! R is
Strongly Pareto if x is strictly preferred to y according to F(%) whenever x weakly Pareto
dominates y under %;
Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives if F(%) and F(%
0) agree on fx;yg whenever % and
%
0 agree on the same set;
Serially Dictatorial if there exists a permutation of individuals  and a tie-breaking pref-
erence  2 R such that F(%) = L(%;;) for all %2 RN.
We now translate Arrow's setting into ours. Given a social welfare function F, dene an
induced social choice correspondence as follows: For all subsets of alternatives Y  X and
all preference proles %2 RN,
f(Y;%) = T(Y;F(%)). (2)
The following proposition relates properties of the social welfare function and those of the
induced social choice correspondence.
Proposition 4.2. If the social welfare function F is Strongly Pareto and Independent of
Irrelevant Alternatives, then the social choice correspondence f dened in Equation (2) sat-
ises SU, IIF and ILA.
Proof. SU: Let y be uniquely weakly Pareto dominant in Y  X at %2 RN. Since F
is strongly Pareto, y is strictly preferred to all other y0 2 Y according to F(%). Hence
T(Y;F(%)) = fyg. By Equation (2), f(Y;%) = fyg.
IIF: Suppose % and %
0 agree on Y  X. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives requires
F(%) and F(%
0) to agree on all pairs y;y0 2 Y . Hence T(Y;F(%)) = T(Y;F(%
0)). By
Equation (2), f(Y;%) = f(Y;%
0).
ILA: Suppose f(X;%) \ Y 6= ;. If x 2 f(X;%) \ Y and y 2 Y is not, then x is strictly
preferred to y according to F(%). Thus x 2 T(Y;F(%)) and y is not. By Equation (2),
f(Y;%) = f(X;%) \ Y . 
By Theorem 3.1, f is serially dictatorial. Thus there exists a permutation of individuals 
and a tie-breaking preference  such that f(fx;yg;%) = T(T N(fx;yg;%;);) for all pairs
of x;y 2 X. By Equation (2), x 2 f(fx;yg;%) is equivalent to x F(%) y. Meanwhile,
12x 2 T(T N(fx;yg;%;);) is equivalent to x L(%;;) y. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem12
follows immediately:
Corollary 4.3 (Arrow's Impossibility Theorem). Any social welfare function F : RN ! R
that is Strongly Pareto and Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives is Serially Dictatorial.
5. Social Choice and Implementation
To avoid confusion with our social choice correspondence on the unrestricted domain, we
call a social choice correspondence dened only on the set of all social alternatives an overall
social choice correspondence, which is a mapping f : RN ! 2X n ;.
Denitions 5.1. An overall social choice correspondence f : RN ! 2X n ; is
Strongly Pareto if f(%) = fxg whenever x is uniquely weakly Pareto dominant at %;
Monotonic if Y  f(%
0)  f(%) whenever Y  f(%) and y %i x implies y %0
i x (with
y i x implies y 0
i x) for all y 2 Y , all x 2 X and all i 2 N;
Dictatorial if there exists an individual i 2 N such that f(%)  T(X;%i) for all %2 RN;
Serially Dictatorial if there exists a permutation of individuals  and a tie-breaking pref-
erence  2 R such that f(%) = T(T N(X;%;);) for all %2 RN.
In this section, we rst show that the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem (Muller and Sat-
terthwaite, 1977) can be derived from Theorem 3.1. Next we turn to implementation and
discuss the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) and the
Jackson-Srivastava Characterization (Jackson and Srivastava, 1996).
5.1. The Muller-Satterthwatie Theorem. Given an overall social choice correspondence






Y is a preference prole taking Y to the top from %.13 If f is a function, so is f.
We need to show that f dened by Equation (3) is a valid social choice correspondence,
that is, f(Y;%)  Y for all Y and all %. This is accomplished by the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2. If an overall social choice correspondence f is Strongly Pareto and Monotonic,
then x = 2 f(%) whenever x is weakly Pareto dominated at %.
12This is a serial dictatorship version. See Luce and Raia (1957, Section 14.5) and Gevers (1979, Theorem 3).
13There are multiple %
Y that take Y to the top from %. One can pick any one of them for each pair of %
and Y to dene an extension. All our results are unaected by the choice of %
Y , hence the choice of the
particular extension used. The same remark applies to Equation (5) in Section 6.
13Proof. Suppose by contradiction that y weakly Pareto dominates x at % but x 2 f(%).
Construct %
0 by taking fx;yg to the top from %. Monotonicity requires x 2 f(%
0) but
Strong Pareto optimality requires f(%
0) = fyg. 
The next proposition relates axioms on f with those on f.
Proposition 5.3. If an overall social choice correspondence f is Strongly Pareto and Mono-
tonic, then the social choice correspondence f dened in Equation (3) is SU, IIF and ILA.
Proof. SU: Follows from Lemma 5.2.
IIF: Suppose % and %
0 agree on Y  X. Then %
Y and %
0Y dier only by the ranking
among alternatives not in Y , which are all ranked below f(%





0Y). By Equation (3), f(Y;%) = f(Y;%
0).
ILA: Suppose Z = f(%) \ Y = f(X;%) \ Y is non-empty. Notice that all individuals
(strictly) prefer each z 2 Z to each x 2 X at %
Y if they (strictly) prefer z to x at %. By
Monotonicity Z  f(%
Y)  f(%). Meanwhile, Lemma 5.2 dictates f(%
Y)  Y . Since
f(%
Y)  f(%) (above, by Monotonicity), f(%
Y)  f(%) \ Y = Z. Hence f(%
Y) = Z.
By Equation (3) and the denition of Z, f(Y;%) = f(X;%) \ Y . 
None of the arguments in Lemma 5.2 and Proposition 5.3 is aected if the preference
domain is restricted to P N. Hence two generalized versions of the Muller-Satterthwaite
Theorem follow immediately from Theorems 3.1 and 3.3:
Corollary 5.4 (Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem). Any overall social choice correspondence
f : RN ! 2X n ; (respectively, f : P N ! 2X n ;) that is Strongly Pareto and Monotonic is
Serially Dictatorial (Dictatorial).
5.2. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. We restrict our attention to overall social
choice functions for the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem since introducing strategy-proofness
for set-valued mappings requires an extension of preferences on X to preferences on 2X, which
is too far a digression14. We also restrict the preference domain to P N, that is, only strict
preferences are admitted. The discussion on the latter restriction is deferred to the end of
this subsection.
Denitions 5.5. An overall social choice function f : P N ! X is
onto if for every x 2 X there is a 2 P N such that f() = x;
Strategy-proof if f() %i f(0
i; i) for all , all i and all 0
i.
Dene also Strong Pareto optimality and Monotonicity for overall social choice functions
dened on P N in the same manner as in Denitions 5.1.
14See G ardenfors (1979) for a survey on early work on this topic. Examples on dierent approaches to this
problem include Duggan and Schwartz (2000); Barber a, Dutta, and Sen (2001); Ching and Zhou (2002).
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Figure 6. Preference Proles for Example 5.8
Lemma 5.6.
(1) Any Strategy-proof overall social choice function f : P N ! X is Monotonic.
(2) Any onto and Monotonic overall social choice function f : P N ! X is Strongly
Pareto.
Proof. See Muller and Satterthwaite (1977); Reny (2001, pp. 104-105). 
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem now follows from Corollary 5.4:
Corollary 5.7 (Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem). Any onto15 and Strategy-proof overall
social choice function f : P N ! X is dictatorial.
The restriction to strict preferences in this subsection is not innocuous, as illustrated by
the next example16:
Example 5.8. There are 3 alternatives, X = fx;y;zg, and 3 individuals, N = f1;2;3g.
The overall social choice function f : RN ! X takes the following form: Individual 1 is the
rst dictator. If Individual 1 has multiple favorites and z is one of them, then Individual 2
will be the second dictator and any remaining tie will be broken by alphabetical order. If
instead z is not among Individual 1's favorite, Individual 3 will be the second dictator and
any remaining tie will be broken by alphabetical order.
It can be easily veried that f is onto and Strategy-proof. However, it is not Strongly
Pareto: At prole % (Figure 6(a)), z is the uniquely weakly Pareto dominant alternative,
yet f(%) = y. Moreover, if f : (2X n;)RN ! X extends f, f violates either IIF or ILA.
If it satises ILA, then f(fx;yg;%
0) = x and f(fx;yg;%
00) = y, which violates IIF since %
and %
0 agree on fx;yg.17
15One can replace the onto assumption with the assumption that the range of f contains at least 3 elements
by redening X to be the range of f (see Barber a and Peleg, 1990). The same remark applies to the strict
preference version of Corollary 5.11 in the Section 5.3.
16We thank Salvador Barber a for this example.
17For similar reasons f also violates Monotonicity.
155.3. The Jackson-Srivastava Characterization. Again we restrict our attention to over-
all social choice functions as it is unclear what it means for a mechanism to implement a
set-valued social choice mapping.
A mechanism M = (A;g) consists of an action prole space A =
Q
i2N Ai and an outcome
function g : A ! X. Let M be the set of all mechanisms. An equilibrium concept is a
mapping E : M  RN ! 2A. The equilibrium outcome correspondence associated with E is
given by
OE(M;%) = fx 2 X : 9a 2 E(M;%) s.t. g(a) = xg.
An overall social choice function f : RN ! X is implemented via equilibrium concept E
and mechanism M if OE(M;%) = f(%) for all %2 RN.
Denitions 5.9 (Jackson-Srivastava). Let M = (A;g) be a mechanism. Take a 2 A, %2 RN
and two groups of individuals S;S0  N. The action prole a0 = (a0
S;a S) is an (S;S0)-
improvement from a at % if g(a0) %i g(a) for all i 2 S0 with at least one strict preference. A
pair of groups (S;S0) is responsive with respect to mechanism M under equilibrium concept
E if a = 2 E(M;%) whenever there exists an (S;S0)-improvement from a at %.







6= OE(M;%), for each a 2 E(M;%) there exists a responsive pair of
groups (S;S0) under E and an (S;S0)-improvement from a at (%
0
i;% i).
When the preference domain is P N, iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies,
Nash equilibrium and Strong equilibrium satisfy direct breaking with respect to all mech-
anisms, while undominated strategies satises direct breaking with respect to all bounded
mechanisms18 (Jackson and Srivastava, 1996). The proofs for the rst three concepts (itera-
tive elimination of strictly dominated strategies, Nash equilibrium and Strong equilibrium)
extend easily when weak preferences are allowed.
The next lemma adapts Jackson and Srivastava's result on Monotonicity and implemen-
tation to the weak preference domain.
Lemma 5.10. Suppose a mechanism M implements an overall social choice function f :
RN ! X via equilibrium concept E. If E satises direct breaking with respect to M, then f
is Monotonic.
Proof. Let f(%) = x and consider %
0 such that x %i y implies x %0
i y (with x i y implying
x 0
i y) for all y 2 X and all i 2 N. Since M implies f via E, OE(M;%) = x. We
claim that OE(M;(%0
i;% i)) = x for any i 2 N. Suppose not and let a 2 E(M;%). Since
E satises direct breaking, there exists a responsive pair of groups (S;S0) with respect to
18A mechanism is bounded if, at each preference prole, each dominated action is dominated by an undom-
inated action.
16M under E and an (S;S0)-improvement a0 = (a0
S;a S) from a at (%
0
i;% i). By denition,
g(a0) %j g(a) = x for all j 2 S0 with at least one strict preference. If i = 2 S0, a0 is an (S;S0)-
improvement from a at %. If i 2 S0, since g(a0) %0
i x implies g(a0) %i x (with strict preference
implying strict preference)19, a0 is also an (S;S0)-improvement from a at %. This contradicts
(S;S0) being responsive. Repeat the same argument with another individual j 6= i starting
at (%
0
i;% i). Proceeding this way we reach %
0 and the social choice remains x. 
The following two versions of the Jackson-Srivastava characterization on equilibrium con-
cepts that lead to impossibility theorems20 are now straight-forward:
Corollary 5.11 (Jackson and Srivastava (1996)). Suppose a mechanism M implements a
Strongly Pareto (respectively, onto) social choice function f : RN ! X (f : P N ! X) via
equilibrium concept E. Then f is serially dictatorial (dictatorial) if and only if E satises
direct breaking with respect to M.
Proof. If: Follows from Lemma 5.10 (and Lemma 5.6 in the case of strict preferences) and
Corollary 5.4.
Only if: Let  = (1;:::;N) be the sequence of serial dictators and  be the tie-breaking
preference. Add a dummy individual N+1 whose only preference is . Suppose OE (M;%) =
x and OE(M;(%
0
i;% i)) = y 6= x. Let k  i be the individual who strictly prefers y to x at
the new preference prole. Now any a0 2 E(M;(%
0
i;% i)) is an (N;k)-improvement from
any a 2 E(M;%) at (%
0
i;% i). Serial dictatorship implies that (N;k) is responsive with
respect to M under E. Therefore E satises direct breaking with respect to M. 
The strict preference version is the original theorem in Jackson and Srivastava (1996).
The weak preference version is a new extension of their theorem. It is essential to state
this extension using Strong Pareto optimality instead of onto, as onto and Monotonicity
guarantee only weak but not strong Pareto optimality when the preference domain is RN.
Due to the remarks after Denition 5.9, Corollary 5.11 implies that any Strongly Pareto
overall social choice function that is implementable via iterative elimination of strictly dom-
inated strategies, Nash equilibrium or Strong equilibrium is Serially Dictatorial. When only
strict preferences are admitted, any onto overall social choice function that is implementable
via undominated strategies in a bounded mechanism is Dictatorial.
6. Strategic Candidacy
Strategic candidacy concerns the eect of a unilateral withdrawal of candidacy on the
election outcome. Hence the social choice is dened on subsets of social alternatives with
19If g(a0) i x, then x 6%0
i g(a0). By the hypothesis on %
0, x 6%i g(a0), which is equivalent to g(a0) i x. If
g(a0) i x, then x 60
i g(a0). By the hypothesis on %
0, x 6i g(a0), which is equivalent to g(a0) %i x.
20We thank Matthew Jackson for pointing us to this theorem.
17at least jXj   1 elements. More generally, one can consider social choices dened on some
X  2X. Say X satises k-set feasibility if for all subsets Y  X, Y 2 X whenever jY j  k.
A voting procedure is a correspondence ^ f : X  RN ! 2X n ; such that ^ f(Y;%)  Y for all
Y 2 X and all %2 RN.21
Denitions 6.1. A voting procedure ^ f : X  RN ! 2X n ; satises
k-set Feasibility if X is k-set feasible;
Strong Unanimity if ^ f(Y;%) = fyg whenever y is uniquely weakly Pareto dominant in
Y 2 X;
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) if ^ f(Y;%) = ^ f(Y;%
0) whenever % and %
0
agree on Y 2 X;
Arrow's Choice Axiom (ACA) if ^ f(Y;%) = ^ f(Z;%) \ Y whenever Y;Z 2 X, Y  Z and
the intersection is non-empty;
Strong Candidate Stability (SCS) if ^ f(Y;%) = ^ f(X;%)\Y whenever Y 2 X, jY j = jXj 1
and the intersection is non-empty;
Dictatorship if there exists an individual i such that ^ f(Y;%)  T(Y;%i) for all Y 2 X
and all %2 RN;
Serial Dictatorship if there exists a permutation of individuals  and a tie-breaking pref-
erence  2 R such that ^ f(Y;%) = T(T N(Y;%;);) for all Y 2 X and all %2 RN.
Obviously, if ^ f is k-set feasible for some k < jXj and satises Arrow's choice axiom, ^ f is
strongly candidate stable.
Lemma 6.2. If the voting procedure ^ f is (jXj   1)-set feasible, strongly unanimous, IIA
and SCS, then f(X;%)  Y whenever each alternative y 2 Y weakly Pareto dominates each
x = 2 Y at %.
Proof. See Eraslan and McLennan (2004, Lemma 1, pp. 41-42). 
Lemma 6.3. Let ^ f be a (jXj   1)-set feasible, strongly unanimous, IIA and SCS voting
procedure. Then ^ f(X;%
Y) = ^ f(X;%) \ Y whenever %
Y takes Y to the top from % and the
intersection is non-empty.
Proof. Fix Y , % and %
Y such that ^ f(X;%) \ Y 6= ;. Let Z = X n Y . Enumerate the
elements of Z as z1;:::;zK. Dene Z0 = ; and Zk = fz1;:::;zkg. Construct %
0=% and
for all k > 0 a preference prole %
k such that: (1) %
k and %
k 1 agree on X n fzkg; (2) %
k
and %




21We do not allow for candidate voters (social alternatives which are also individuals).
18We claim that for all k  0,
^ f(X;%
k) = ^ f(X;%) n Zk. (4)
The case of k = 0 is trivial. Suppose Equation (4) holds for k   1. Since, by assumption,
^ f(X;%) \ Y 6= ;, the induction hypothesis implies ^ f(X;%
k 1) 6= fzkg. Thus
^ f(X;%
k) = ^ f(X;%
k) \ (X n fzkg) (Lemma 6.2)
= ^ f(X n fzkg;%
k) (SCS)
= ^ f(X n fzkg;%
k 1) (IIA)
= ^ f(X;%
k 1) \ (X n fzkg) (SCS)
=

^ f(X;%) n Zk 1

n fzkg (Induction hypothesis)
= ^ f(X;%) n Zk.
Therefore ^ f(X;%
Y) = ^ f(X;%) n Z = ^ f(X;%) \ Y . 
Given a voting procedure ^ f that satises k-set feasibility for some k < jXj, Strong Una-
nimity, IIA and ACA, extend it to our unrestricted domain by dening: for all Y  X and
all %2 RN,
f(Y;%) = ^ f(X;%
Y), (5)
where %
Y is a preference prole that takes Y to the top from %. Lemma 6.2 guarantees
f(Y;%)  Y so f is a valid social choice correspondence. Lemma 6.3 and ACA ensure
^ f(X;%
Y) = ^ f(X;%) \ Y = ^ f(Y;%) for all Y 2 X, so f is indeed an extension of ^ f.
Proposition 6.4. If a voting procedure ^ f is (jXj   1)-set feasible, strongly unanimous, IIA
and SCS, then the social choice correspondence f dened in Equation (5) satises SU, IIF
and ILA.
Proof. SU: If y is uniquely weakly Pareto dominant in Y  X at %, then y is uniquely
weakly Pareto dominant in X at any %
Y taking Y to the top from %. Strong Unanimity of
^ f and Equation (5) ensure f(Y;%) = ^ f(X;%
Y) = fyg.
IIF: If % and %
0 agree on Y  X, then %
Y takes Y to the top from %
0Y as well. Lemma 6.2
guarantees that both ^ f(X;%
Y) and ^ f(X;%
0Y) are subsets of Y . Applying Lemma 6.3 we
obtain ^ f(X;%
Y) = ^ f(X;%
0Y) \ Y = ^ f(X;%
0Y). By Equation (5), f(Y;%) = f(Y;%
0).
ILA: Follows from Lemma 6.3. 
Since the above argument is unaected by restricting the preference domain to P N, two
versions of the Grether-Plott Theorem22 are immediate from Theorems 3.1 and 3.3:
22We thank John Weymark for pointing us to this theorem.
19Corollary 6.5 (Grether and Plott (1982)). If a voting procedure ^ f : X  RN ! 2X n ;
(respectively, ^ f : X  P N ! 2X n ;) satises k-set feasibility for some k < jXj, Strong
Unanimity, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Arrow's Choice Axiom, it is Serially
Dictatorial (Dictatorial).
The impossibility theorem under strategic candidacy follows as a special case:
Corollary 6.6 (Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (2001)23). If a voting procedure ^ f : XRN !
2X n; (respectively, ^ f : X P N ! 2X n;) is (jXj 1)-set feasible, Strongly Unanimous, In-
dependent of Irrelevant Alternatives and Strongly Candidate Stable, it is Serially Dictatorial
(Dictatorial).
7. Conclusion
This paper proposes a unifying impossibility theorem. Unanimity and our two indepen-
dence conditions underlie the axioms of a number of classical impossibility theorems. Thus
even if one nds the axioms of these impossibility theorems disputable, our theorem indicates
that any alternative set of axioms that implies ours leads also to dictatorship.
Several extensions are possible. For instance, one can modify our denitions to prove
an impossibility theorem under the set of all continuous preferences over a compact metric
space of social alternatives (c.f.: Barber a and Peleg, 1990). Another possibility is to allow
randomized social choices (c.f.: Beno^ t, 2002). Finally, one may use the ultralter method
of Kirman and Sondermann (1972) to obtain dictatorship when there are innitely many
individuals.
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